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Abstract 
 
 
 
Eberlyn, Preston J. M.A., Department of Political Science, International and Comparative 
Politics Graduate Program, Wright State University, 2017. Improv in International Diplomacy: 
Creating A Cooperative Narrative. 
 
 
The utilization of improvisation theatre in businesses and organizations to revolve conflict began 
to be used at the turn of the century. This new and growing tool has helped with company 
mergers and internal disputes. Thus, why not use these same improv theatre elements in 
international conflicts? The analysis of three distinct cases of track two diplomacy and improv 
theatre has shown the possibility of a new tool for diplomacy mediators to utilize.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 On a humid Florida night in late February 2012, an event occurred which sparked a 
cultural conversation in the United States that continues to this day. The death of Trayvon Martin 
on February 26, 2012 and the acquittal of Martin’s killer, George Zimmerman, sparked protests 
and outrage in the United States. Two years later, the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, 
Missouri, further exacerbated tensions within the United States regarding race and class. In the 
United States the kind of conversations which resulted from these conflicts has taken place in 
myriad ways: online blogs, print media, protests, private conversations, political rallies.  
 But what about in other nations? The fact that Israeli leaders refer to Israel as “the Jewish 
State” is indicative of the cultural divide between the Jewish and non-Jewish citizenry within its 
borders. In 1993 and 1995, the Oslo I and Oslo II Accords were signed and marked an attempt at 
peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ultimately, the cultural divide between the 
two was too strong, and the peace was dissolved in 2000 (Barak, 2005). Yemen is currently 
engaged in a civil war after more than a decade of conflict. While many peace agreements were 
negotiated in the 2000s between the Yemeni government and the Northern Houthi group, all 
agreements were broken resulting in the nation being engulfed in a civil war that cost over 5,000 
lives as of March 2015 (Sharp, 2015).  
Israel and Yemen are only two of many examples in which official diplomacy has failed. 
If official diplomacy is failing in these conflicts, what about “citizen diplomacy” or track two 
diplomacy (Jones, 2015)? Track one diplomacy is what most people think of when they hear that 
states are engaging in diplomacy with other states. Track one or “official diplomacy” takes place 
between people of authority and power within states (Mapendere, 2005). The engagement in 
diplomacy by citizens and other non-official individuals who are affected by a conflict is known 
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as track two diplomacy. In engaging in track two diplomacy citizens, former officials, and other 
players seek to find solutions which might lead to a resolution of conflict within their nation or 
region.  
Track two diplomacy is a broad concept that focuses on the process of the engagement 
between various individuals with no state power or authority (Jones, 2015). When citizens are 
able to harness the power of track two diplomacy they have the ability to create a narrative. This 
narrative is an outward expression of the nature of the conflict within their nation. In other 
words, the narrative explains the conflict within the nation in a way that more people both inside 
and outside the nation can understand. Narratives can envision what lasting peace looks like. 
Further, while process is key to track two diplomacy, there is no set of rules or procedures for 
those citizens and individuals who wish to engage in track two diplomacy and create this 
narrative. Some practitioners of track two diplomacy have provided various roadmaps for 
successful track two diplomacy engagement, but there is a lack of principles to guide the 
engagement. For example, Kaye (2007, p. 33) provides a set of stages: “socialization, filtering, 
and policy adjustment,” but within the context she explains that “these stages are not necessarily 
sequential.” A new method or tool is needed to steer the process that citizens are attempting to 
create when they engage in track two diplomacy.  
Whether performance or visual, every form of art exhibits a narrative. Art is often known 
as the universal language that can speak across cultures and generations. There is an 
understanding within art, that anyone can engage in an artistic endeavor to create a narrative. 
Similarly, track two diplomacy inherently sets a foundation of an equal playing field because 
there are no officials present. While there may be facilitators from non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) present, the overall narrative is created by the citizens themselves.  
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Improvisational theatre companies often are set up in much the same way, where no one 
person is the lead or the star. Rather, they are a single company trying to solve a single problem 
by creating a narrative together (Hough, 2011). Thus, we can ask, are individuals who engage in 
track two diplomacy more likely to succeed by utilizing improvisational theatre elements? The 
melding of these two disciplines may find an overlap, which would present practitioners of track 
two diplomacy a new tool.  
In recent years, there has been an influx of new programs and professional development 
opportunities that provide an opportunity for growth in organizations and the individuals within 
the organization. Consulting organizations and companies such as ImprovAsylum, Business 
Improv, and ImprovEdge are just a few of the improvisation theatre companies that have popped 
up in recent years. These consulting organizations seek to provide executives, line workers, and 
various other employees of small to large companies a new way of thinking about work and their 
interactions with their internal and external stakeholders (Hough, 2011). 
What many of these improvisational theatre organizations have found to be key in 
solving organizational conflict are a set of processes that propel an organization past its hostile 
and dysfunctional work environment. Consequently, a wide variety of the efforts provided by 
organizations such as ImprovEdge are a set of prescriptions and methods derived from the 
tenants of improvisation theatre to combat the fear and conflict within the organizations they 
consult (Hough, 2011). Within improvisation theatre there is an indication of a space where the 
only limit to a solution is the participant’s imagination. This presents an intersection of these two 
disparate concepts. What Jones (2015) calls “group explorations” in track two diplomacy, 
Crossan (1998) terms “building blocks” in improv theatre. 
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The structure of current track two diplomacy practices and the lack of formal process is a 
result of the absence of a standard set of practices which participants can follow to create a 
coherent narrative. Therefore, by looking to improvisational theatre as several corporations have 
done in the modern era, there might be a basic guide that can be replicated for track two 
diplomacy practitioners.  
Thus, by utilizing improvisational theatre techniques in track two diplomatic missions, 
would the engagement be made more successful? This is the question I will be exploring further 
in my research, as it is a unique blend of an underappreciated form of conflict resolution and an 
equally under represented art form. Track two diplomacy is so often seen by state officials as ill-
equipped to handle real world conflict in a growing divergent world. However, with the right 
tools for those who engage in track two diplomacy, the possibility of a peaceful narrative being 
created is much more likely.  
Notably, the scope of what I am looking at are intrastate conflicts that persist in a state of 
physical and psychological feuding.  The conflicts should present two ideologically, religious, or 
ethnic differences between the feuding factions. This scope is key to first examining possible 
expansion of improvisational theatre elements into the realm of international conflict resolution. 
Improvisational theatre is used often within companies for internal professional development and 
growth between existing departments and co-workers. Likewise, by looking at conflicts within a 
state that persist due to ideological, religious, or ethnic feuding there is a parallel of principles. In 
other words, the scope of this inquiry is most represented by the tool that is being examined for 
efficacy, improvisational theatre. The scope of inquiry is important to note because it provides 
the richest cases to examine due to the nature of intrastate conflicts, which is conflicts that are 
more likely to be rooted in historical disagreement.  
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Section 1.1: Significance 
 In order to create a coherent narrative that will affect change in their nation, citizens who 
engage in track two diplomacy need more effective guidelines. By looking at art forms, 
specifically improvisational theatre, I hope to find guidelines that coincide with the concept of 
track two diplomacy. It is clear that an overlay is present in the basic tenants of each. What is not 
clear is what effect the introduction of a new tool, improvisational theatre, has on creating a more 
effective narrative of the citizenry within track two diplomacy engagements in intrastate 
conflicts. Thus, by looking at cases and instances where possible improvisational theatre 
elements were present in track two diplomacy of intrastate conflicts, I hope to find a new more 
effective tool for track two diplomacy practitioners to utilize. The overall significance of what 
this analysis will attempt is to find a more effective tool to be used in conflict resolution and, 
more specifically, track two diplomacy practice.  
 
Section 1.2: What is Success? 
 The overall success of any intrastate conflict resolution is set by the two sides of the 
endeavor as to whether or not each side will accept the terms of an agreement that is reached 
through negotiations and diplomacy. However track two diplomacy, in and of itself, does not 
provide a clear description of success (Mapendere, 2005). In many instances the success is 
judged by what is accomplished. It is the hope that within intrastate conflicts the nature of the 
talks of track two diplomacy allow for a freeing dialogue about more systemic and culturally 
relevant topics that create a narrative of change within the society. The change created could be a 
narrative of tolerance, acceptance, or any such endeavor that the participants wish to manifest. 
Thus, an overall successful track two diplomacy endeavor would result in the creation of some 
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sort of joint narrative from the two opposing sides, which would provide a set of next steps to the 
transfer the negotiations to an “official” track (Jones, 2015). This joint narrative would be 
expected to drive the conflict into the other levels of success.  
 
Subsection 1.2.a: Levels of success. 
 For the purposes of my research, I define success through a series of levels, each of 
which denotes another step in the overall success of a track two diplomatic mission to bring 
about some sort of official recognition and progress to a solution to the problem.  
1. The creation of a shared narrative between participants. 
2. The acceptance of the narrative by the constituencies of both sides. 
3. “Official” or track one progress towards a settlement that was a result of the narrative.  
The third and final level of success denotes the success of the track two diplomatic effort, but not 
necessarily the success of the overall conflict resolution effort. As track two diplomacy shifts 
into track one or “official” track, the efficacy of the narrative created is no longer testable 
because of the change in the method of delivery (Jones, 2015).   
 
Section 1.3: What is Next? 
 Throughout all the sections there will be a prevailing concept that continues to emerge: 
narrative as a form of conflict resolution and storytelling is key to the efficacy of improvisational 
theatre elements as a tool in track two diplomacy. The literature review is presented in sections 
focused on conflict resolution and improvisational theatre, with a concluding section of 
synthesis. The literature review begins with the large area of study, conflict resolution, and is 
slowly funneled to track two diplomatic endeavors within intrastate conflicts. Likewise, in the 
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improvisational theatre section, broken into the larger area of improvisation and then moves to 
the usage of improvisational techniques in business and conflict management. Following the 
literature review is the methodology and research design section which outlines a case analysis 
approach to examining track two diplomacy and the efficacy of improvisational theatre elements 
in successful resolution of a conflict. Also, there is further explanation of the scope of conditions 
I will be examining. The concluding section of the research design is my overall outline for the 
remaining parts of the case analysis and examination of evidence. This section also includes 
further justification of my research method and the overall impact that this method will have on 
the research done.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 In beginning to answer whether the utilization of improvisational theatre techniques in 
track two diplomatic missions promotes more successful engagement, the various sections will 
explain what the current literature says on the scope of conflict resolution within intrastate 
conflict, track two diplomacy, improvisational theatre, and intersections between these elements. 
The following sections are organized in such a way that presents each concept’s theoretical 
backing, followed with the practical application and the current state of knowledge about the 
efficacy of the application.   
 
Section 2.1: Conflict Resolution of Intrastate Conflict 
 Conflict resolution is a complex and nuanced field of study. In examining the field, there 
are many different terms that express very similar points. Throughout the process of conflict 
resolution there is a prevailing notion of “conflict transformation” versus “conflict settlement.” 
The latter provides a good understanding of how a conflicting group is perceived to have 
conceded to the opposing side. However, it is more likely that conflict transformation provides 
the same concessions under a different name (Babbitt & Hampson, 2011). In terms of narrative, 
though, conflict transformation is more likely to accept a new narrative that is created by the 
various sides of a negotiation. Within conflict settlement there is an intrinsic understanding that 
both sides are “settling” for the outcome of the negotiations rather than finding a solution that 
works with all sides. The distinction of terms helps to shape the narrative created through the 
resolution process, and it is that narrative that helps to determine the efficacy of the conflict 
resolution (Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2011).  
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In focusing on intrastate conflict resolution, there has been a shift since the Cold War in 
the involvement of third party actors in conflicts. The focus on third party actors, on an intrastate 
level, is chiefly found when the conflict has created consequences for surrounding regions and 
areas (Babbitt, 2009). Further examination of such interventions by third party advocates find 
there is an important social-psychological component to the conflict resolution. Dermidögen 
examined the efficacy of Herbert C. Kelman’s intervention in the pre-negotiations between Israel 
and Palestine in reaching the Oslo Agreement. What Dermidögen found that was key to the 
success of the workshops Kelman held between Israeli and Palestinians was the ability to 
effectively and openly express the concerns of the narratives each side was used to hearing and 
experiencing (2011).  
Further, within the research of intrastate conflict Barbara F. Walter provides a multitude 
of literature on why in many cases even getting combatants on either side of the conflict to the 
“bargaining table” does not suggest a guaranteed peace. Solving the overall issues of the conflict 
is not the issue, as Walter argues, rather the issue is the implementation of the policy agreement 
that is being proposed and signed (2002, p.5). Walter’s theory of why conflicts can be resolved 
through an agreed deal but never implemented, taps into the notion of “conflict transformation” 
vs. “conflict settlement.” While combatants are likely to find tangible pieces that they want or do 
not want conceded, the more important aspect is the underlying issues that can only be resolved 
through a successful conflict mediation process. What’s more, Walter explains that most civil or 
intrastate conflicts are fought along ethnic lines, and when the government is involved in the 
conflict the conflict has historically gone on for longer and caused more casualties (2009, p. 6). 
Walter argues that ethnic differences within countries promote conflict based on the notion of 
self-determination, and thus more conflict is likely to break out on the basis of such 
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determination and the governments want to show strength against other groups that might want 
to succeed (2009, p. 131).  
Further argument and research suggests that governments that are more open and readily 
able to talk about the underlying issues are more likely to end conflict (Walter, 2004). The 
leaders within the government also possess a large amount of soft power. This power is in their 
messaging and narrative creation and can positively or negatively affect the country’s population 
(Tingley & Walter, 2011). The aforementioned factors of leader messaging, historical ethnic 
conflict with the government, self-determination within intrastate conflicts and civil wars play an 
important role in how to best resolve the conflict. The importance of transforming the conflict 
and narrative to fit both sides is key to the overall success of the agreement and implementation 
of the agreement. Supplementary analysis of the competing theories on why some agreements 
succeed and some don’t point to the power of those creating the agreement. Kydd and Walter 
find that when groups are attempting to derail the peace process they are focusing on “fostering 
mistrust” in the moderate groups and their narrative for an agreement (2002, p. 264). 
Furthermore, the overall goal of conflict resolution is to solve the conflict that is happening. This 
requires successful implementation of the agreement that is finalized by the official parties that 
are doing the negotiation, but what Walter finds is far too often the sides fail to implement the 
agreement (2002).  The failure to implement is the key portion of conflict resolution that must be 
worked to fix as it is the part that truly determines whether or not a conflict resolution was 
successful or whether the endeavor was not successful in addressing the underlying issues that 
caused the failure to implement.  
In order to better find and fix the underlying issues within conflict, a space is needed for 
safe and open communication between sides. Herbert C. Kelman promotes the notion of 
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“intergroup techniques” and “workshops” to converse and share ideas about what conflict means 
to the participants. The earliest account of these workshops was in 1971 wherein Kelman, 
Stephen P. Cohen, Frederick D. Miller, and Bruce L. Smith engaged in a pilot program between 
Israeli and Palestinians (1977). Cohen et al. (1977) explain the workshop’s success and failures. 
One failure or shortcoming that is expressed is that there were no government officials or anyone 
of consequential power involved in the workshop (Cohen et al., 1977, p. 168). However, this 
was, by its very nature one of the first documented forms of track two diplomacy, because it 
involved citizens discussing issues and topics of conflict in a safe and open environment. 
Nevertheless, true to track two diplomacy’s root, the workshop did not end in a joint narrative 
nor any clear narrative, but what this workshop did was to lay the foundation for further third 
party intervention and facilitation of workshops in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 1994, 
Kelman, along with Nadmin N. Rouhana, published an article revitalizing the idea of joint 
thinking in conflicts. Rouhana and Kelman argue that the effects of “interactive problem 
solving,” while minimal and time consuming, have an effect on the overall efficacy of the 
agreement’s that are reached in those conflicts (1994, p. 159). Kelman (1998, pp. 191-192) 
present’s five assumptions that are key to acceptance of the efficacy of interactive problem 
solving and those are: 
1. The individual is key as a unit of analysis in international conflict. 
2. International conflict must also be viewed as intersocietal conflict. 
3. Conflict is by definition an interactive process that is dynamic. 
4. Conflict resolution on the international level must employee more diverse influential 
processes. 
5. Conflict has the possibility to change.  
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Kelman’s assumptions are important in the examination of the efficacy of track two diplomacy 
as an interactive problem solving tool because otherwise the analysis will be weighted by the 
importance of the interactions of divergent groups with little to no influential power. A key point 
that Kelman examines is the movement of micro solutions to macro or country sized conflicts. 
Kelman argues that interactive problem solving and citizen involvement on the micro level has a 
tremendous effect on the overall efficacy of state sponsored solutions to issues (2000). 
Equally, the issue within conflict resolution is controlling or removing differing 
narratives that promote the conflict, rather than work to resolve the conflict. The conflict is often 
exacerbated due to missed cues and misinterpretations of the other side’s actions. As Kaufman 
explains, the accepted narrative by each side can greatly skew the overall truth of a narrative, 
because the symbols and stereotypes of a certain side are not accurately portrayed (2009). 
Kaufman’s theory of symbolic politics further explains the possible causes of intrastate ethnic 
conflicts. Kaufman establishes his theory on the notion that group myths are formed by opposing 
groups, which promotes hostile symbols and narratives between the groups (2006). By utilizing 
Kaufman’s symbolic politics theory as foundation of intrastate ethnic conflict, there is an 
understanding that the two opposing sides will need to create a narrative together to resolve the 
conflict, but the question becomes what tools are available for such an undertaking?  
 
Section 2.2: Track Two Diplomacy in Theory 
The hope and use of track two diplomacy is to create a tool in which a truthful narrative 
emerges. The idea of a “truthful narrative” is a misnomer because the overall truth is determined 
and accepted by both sides. Therefore, the truthfulness of the narrative is judged by those two 
sides who created it together and those two decide its efficacy in resolving the conflict. Track 
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two diplomacy can be a messy form of diplomacy to define, as it is often portrayed in the 
incorrect context. Further, there has only been one comprehensive book written on track two 
diplomacy, and within the book Peter Jones expresses the intricacy of track two diplomacy in 
one line, “track two is complex and multifaceted” (Jones, 2015). Too often track two diplomacy 
is marginalized to a set of negotiations by non-official actors that amount to no significant 
change (Notter & Diamon, 1996).  
True track two diplomacy involves negotiations between non-state actors that have the 
possibility to transfer what is discussed in the track two talks to track one negotiations or 
negotiations that contain official state actors. This definition allows for fluidity of the goals and 
objectives for which track two diplomacy is attempting to find solutions, but it does not provide 
clear and concise methods to engage in the negotiations (Jones, 2008).  As Jones explains, the 
strength of track two diplomacy is how loose the rules and end goal are. However, he further 
explains this strength is also its greatest weakness, as it does not allow for objective repetition of 
solutions (2015).  
Additionally, it should be noted that track two diplomacy theory is predicated on the idea 
that members from two conflict sides are willing to engage. The willingness of these members to 
participate in track two diplomacy is much easier, though, when engaging with other non-state 
actors. Also, the conflicting narratives are easier to mend and bypass with non-state actors than 
those engaged in the official narrative creation. This is a result of how official actors in 
negotiations are perceived to act in official negotiations, whereas in track two diplomacy there is 
no need for such perceptions as everyone is, by virtue of track two, equal in their own right 
(Kaufman, 2004). This equity of participants is important to the overall success of track two 
diplomacy as an interactive problem solving tool in the international conflict realm because the 
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members are more likely to get involved when such ground rules are set (Kelman, 2000). Track 
two diplomacy is truly citizen diplomacy in its engagement of non-state actors as means of micro 
to macro level change in a conflict. The idea of track two diplomacy as a means of conflict 
resolution is more concurrent with official diplomacy than it may suggest, but it is also a means 
to start. In other words, track two diplomacy endeavors can begin at any stage of an international 
conflict and they can work in parallel with diplomatic endeavors by state officials (Jones, 2015). 
This measure of working concurrently is more likely to produce favorable outcomes in the end as 
minds are being changed at the base level of the conflict and thus there is less likelihood of 
attempted demonstrations to end the official diplomacy (Walter, 2009). 
 Further, the notion of engaging in track two diplomacy may be difficult for members of 
opposing sides to want to engage, but the act of engaging in track two diplomacy between these 
opposing sides often is a way to empower them with the confidence to continue (Burgess & 
Burgess, 2010). Burgess and Burgess go on to explain that the empowerment of these non-state 
and low-power individuals often helps to transfer to or embolden others within their respective 
groups to feel empowered for change (2010). Generally, the notion of empowering calls back to 
the importance of collective narrative creation and collaboration between sides. The empowered 
individuals are more likely to promote the positive joint narrative that was created, and push 
official actors in the conflict to pursue a peaceful narrative as well. The overall efficacy of a 
track two diplomacy venture is the creation of a narrative that is both shared and centered in truth 
that allows for possible “transfer” to higher power levels in the respective groups involved 
(Jones, 2015). 
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 Subsection 2.2.a: Track two diplomacy’s efficacy. 
 Jones explains the importance that “transferring” plays in the efficacy of track two 
diplomacy negotiations (2015). “Transferring” is the ability to shift what is discussed in track 
two negotiations into official negotiations between persons of power. The ability to transfer these 
talks is grounded in a few leading principles, such as members who engaged in the track two 
negotiations having influence with official actors, becoming official actors in the future, or some 
variation of those two. However, the overall success of track two diplomacy is hard to assess or 
track (Mapendere, 2005). One of the chief reasons is because the idea of “transferring” is 
centered around the idea of having what is negotiated within track two diplomacy reach the 
official level. The process of current track two diplomacy does not have a concrete set of rules or 
steps to create the narrative that will drive the official discussions (Chigas, 1997). The lack of 
any concrete and solid foundational rules or steps for promoting success and the overall efficacy 
of track two diplomacy is an obstacle. It may be important to look to another discipline of study 
altogether to find that solution needed to plug the gap in the track two diplomacy efficacy 
problem. 
 
Section 2.3: Improvisational Theatre 
 Track two diplomatic engagements are only as successful as the willingness of the 
participants are in working and listening to each other. The key to a successful improvisational 
theatre troupe is their ability to work together on finding the truth of a scene (Halpen, Close, & 
Johnson, 1994). The truth of a scene is a solution to a problem, it is a key to a lock, it is the 
essential answer that bonds the actors together in a performance.  A troupe’s ability to read an 
audience and play off the emotions and feelings of the crowd often determines if the troupe will 
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create a funny or memorable narrative. Many improvisation shows open with the performers 
asking for topics from the audience, and the success of the performance is based on the 
performers’ ability to find the truth of the topic.  
The first rule many young improv performers are taught is to always accept what another 
actor gives you with a “yes.” Then, to go one step further add an “and” to that “yes” to create a 
“yes, and” phrase that will lift the creative narrative to new heights (Halpen et al, 1994). Often 
many technically trained theatre actors believe improvisation theatre actors are untrained and 
unrehearsed, but in reality the opposite is true. Improvisation theatre troupes train for hours each 
day to maintain a close connection with their fellow performers, as well as making sure to create 
innovative and distinct narratives for the shows with audiences (Hough, 2011). The general 
creation of a narrative that is created by the actors on the stage marks stark similarities to the way 
in which track two diplomacy is employed.  
 
 Subsection 2.3.a: Improv in Business 
 Using improvisational theatre methods as a professional development tool for companies 
is a fairly recent idea. However, workshops and presentations expressing the value of 
improvisation in business has been around since the late 1980s (Crossan, 1998). Within the 
workshops and sessions taught by improvisation, facilitators are the core of what make 
improvisational theatre unique. The idea of a truthful narrative comes into play quickly with the 
acceptance of a participant’s exchange with another person. The same elements that make an 
improv performance successful translate to successful business development. Hough examines 
these elements with her company ImprovEdge, and she offers the “secrets” to improv in business 
(2011): 
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1. The creation of a “yes” space (Halpen et al, pg. 5, 1994). 
2. The ability to build off other participants (Hough, pg. 45, 2011). 
3. The equity of all involved in the endeavor (Hough, pg. 81, 2011). 
4. Finding success in failure (Halpen et al, pg. 53, 1994). 
 Within each of the “secrets” or keys to success is an enormous amount of narrative 
creation potential. The first is the creation of a yes space, which is inherent in any improv 
enterprise, whether with a business or for entertainment. Acceptance of another person’s idea or 
suggestions does not mean following through with that idea, but it does mean accepting what that 
person has offered the situation and seeing if that might help inform the narrative that assists in 
the situation (Kelly, 2012). The second is an extension of the first, and that is to build off of other 
people’s contributions. Adding an “and” in with the “yes” to the initial person’s contribution 
creates another jumping point for the group to continue to explore options for the given situation 
(Hough, 2011). Third is equity of participants, which focuses on the essence of the narrative 
creation for the group. This element focuses on each participant being an active participant, both 
when listening and when speaking (Crossan, 1998). Equity of participants focuses on the idea 
that everyone has something to contribute and no one person has the solution, so it is important 
to listen to everyone involved. The fourth and final element is perhaps the critical part to 
improvisation’s power, and that is finding success in failure or, as Hough puts it “oops to 
Eureka” (2011, p. 121). This element allows for growth from failure and trying new and 
divergent things. However, an improv engagement can be successful without this final element. 
The essence of this element is that even when every element is in focus and the group is working 
through a situation, the group might find the narrative they were creating is a complete failure. 
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However, the group’s ability to accept this failure and shift it into a successful and productive 
narrative is what improv focuses on stimulating (Kelly, 2012).  
 Subsection 2.3.b: Improv in Conflict Resolution 
 The four elements to successful implementation of improv elements within a business 
translate to a business or organization’s use of improv in resolving conflict. This is another form 
by which improv is used in businesses and organization, to resolve conflict. Whether this conflict 
is between two organizations or departments within one organization the same elements are key 
to the successful resolution of the conflict. An overlap of applicability between the tenants of 
improvisation and conflict resolution is seen within the four keys presented. Within the realm of 
track two diplomacy an inherent rule is set that all the participants hold the same equity, which is 
illustrative of the endeavor in which the participants are willing to engage (Mapendere, 2005). 
This rule parallels nicely with the third improvisation key of equity of everyone engaged in an 
endeavor. Further, beyond simple equity of the participants there is a shared, recognized 
legitimacy to the other participant’s involvement in the enterprise. This recognition thus ties with 
the acceptance of another participant’s ideas and contributions to the engagement, and creates a 
space that allows participants to grow in their respective frames of thought and experience. This 
overall acceptance melds nicely with the notion of utilizing other participant’s ideas as building 
blocks in the creation of a joint narrative.  
 
Section 2.4: Hypothesis 
The creation of a joint narrative is key to the overall success and efficacy of both track 
two diplomacy and improvisational theatre. Therefore, I hypothesize that track two diplomacy 
instances that utilize elements of improvisational theatre will be more successful than those that 
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do not contain such elements. Due to what the current literature is suggesting, this seems to be a 
logical assumption. The overall efficacy of improvisational theatre elements in mending conflict 
in businesses and organizations gives an indication that the same might be possible on the 
international level. Further, the inherent similarities between track two diplomacy practice and 
improvisational theatre elements in business indicates a possible link in using improvisational 
theatre elements as a tool. The likelihood that a proven tool such as improvisational theatre will 
promote further success in track two diplomacy engagements is to be anticipated. Further, it is 
very likely that many elements of improvisational theatre have been utilized in track two 
diplomacy engagements without the facilitator’s or participant’s knowledge. These cases will 
help to provide the basis of testing the presented hypothesis.  
 
Section 2.5: Process Tracing  
 Track two diplomacy and the interactive problem solving techniques that are utilized 
within it require a method of examination that can illuminate causal effectiveness of 
improvisational theatre elements on track two diplomacy endeavors. Therefore, I have elected to 
utilize a case study analysis which will provide insight as to possible application of this tool. 
Further, the overall nature of the analysis is to examine the efficacy that improvisational theatre 
elements have on track two diplomacy, and because no international conflict resolution 
practitioner is known to have used improvisational theatre as a tool I will draw on examples that 
best match with the outlined elements of a successful improvisational approach to determine 
which, if any, cases used such elements and have been more successful because of that use.   
 In order to analyze the efficacy of improvisational theatre in track two diplomacy, I will 
utilize process tracing over time that will determine whether an improvisational theatre element 
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was the causal link in determining the success of a track two diplomacy engagement (George & 
Bennett, 2005). The four elements I will be specifically looking for are the four improvisational 
components: 
1. The creation of a “yes” space (Halpen et al, pg. 5, 1994). 
2. The ability to build off other participants (Hough, pg. 45, 2011). 
3. The equity of all involved in the endeavor (Hough, pg. 81, 2011). 
4. Finding success in failure (Halpen et al, pg. 53, 1994). 
The translation of these components or elements within given cases may pose the largest threat 
to the research. As George and Bennett warn there are two limitations to using process tracing, 
and the ability to create or find an uninterrupted causal path, in examining track two diplomacy 
cases will require reliable historical data of the cases (2005). In determining if these elements are 
present, there are several factors that must be present in each.  
For the creation of a “yes” space, each participant must willingly agree to participate in 
the endeavor. There must be a set of rules or guidelines present about what can be spoken about 
and what is not to be spoken about. However, the more freeing the guidelines, the easier it will 
be to determine the presence of a “yes” space. The second element of improvisational theatre is 
where the joint narrative starts to take shape, as it requires that participants build off of each 
other’s ideas and input. Therefore, to determine the presence of this element, the two sides will 
have had to agree on at least two parts of a narrative and at least one of each of those parts must 
come from each side. Determining the presence of the third element requires two important 
components. First, none of the participants are state or official actors or acting directing on 
behalf of an official. Second, the participants must agree that all the participants who are present 
may participate. This does not mean that the participation must be equal and each person speaks 
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for the same amount of time. Rather, it means that each participant has equal chance to speak and 
add to the dialogues. The final element is applicable if something were to go wrong. The easiest 
way to determine if something goes wrong is if the engagement ends because of something that 
is said. The success part of this failure would require that participants come together after this 
break in dialogue and talk about the why the talks ceased. Then, the participants move forward 
with the engagement.  
While the improvisational theatre elements are the independent variables in my analysis, 
the success of a case is going to be key. The use of the three levels of success are going to be key 
to determining wherein certain cases fall. 
1. The creation of a shared narrative between participants. 
2. The acceptance of the narrative by the constituencies of both sides. 
3. “Official” or track one progress towards a settlement that was a result of the narrative.  
These levels of success are important in determining overall efficacy of the tool that is being 
used. Each level builds off the previous level to strengthen the overall resolution of a conflict. 
The first level requires that the participants of an endeavor write down what is discussed and 
agreed upon by both sides. Acceptance of this agreement by the constituencies of both sides will 
require a powerful narrative. However, a powerful joint narrative will be more effective in 
changing and shaping the constituencies. One of the most effective ways to tell if a narrative is 
applicable in penetrating through to the various constituency would be public polling, but this is 
highly unlikely to take place in many of these conflict regions. Therefore, if state news or 
international news sources share the new narrative from the talks, success at that level will be 
reached. The third and final level can be attained by going through the other two levels or it 
could be jumped to, which goes back to the “transferring” that track two diplomacy relies on. If 
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any official action towards a peaceful agreement is taken due to the joint narrative that was 
created, then the third level will have been reached.  
Concurrently, it is highly likely that other possible variables might suggest conflicting results 
of my cases, and ultimately lead to skewed results of the true causal mechanism. Some of these 
possible outlier variables are: 
1. Intervention by an “official” or state-sponsored actor  
2. The death or killing of state actors  
a. Change in leadership  
3. Third party intervention 
4. Existing solutions or resolutions are reformed  
a. Pre-existing agreements are utilized  
 
Section 2.6: Structure, Focused, Comparison 
 In utilizing Alexander George and Andrew Bennett’s (2005) structured, focused, 
comparison approach to standardize and begin analyzing the three cases that were selected. The 
first section in Table 2.1 contains the background information of each of the cases. The years of 
engagement, question 1.1, begin with the year that the first track two engagement happened and 
end with the year that a formal agreement was reached. The length of the engagement is the 
range of years from beginning to end following the years of engagement scheme. The final 
question in the first section is the number of key actors involved in the engagement. The second 
section deals with the independent variable of inquiry. The four questions direct relate to the four 
key improvisational theatre elements.  
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The final question in the second section, question 2.4, requires that a track two 
engagement end abruptly without an immediate reconciliation. Question 2.4.a regarding the 
reconciliation of the breakdown is key to determining if that variable is present in each case. The 
final section of Table 2.1 provides the dependent variable of success with a framework to 
develop. The main question of a shared narrative is key to determining the efficacy of the track 
two engagement, but arguably what is more important is the overall resolution of the conflict and 
whether the shared narrative aided in the continued resolution of the conflict. Therefore, the final 
question, 3.2.b, of whether the conflict is still resolved is essential in determining whether the 
shared narrative created was effective.  
Table 2.1 
 
1.1) Years of Engagement 
1.2) Length of Engagement 
1.3) Number of Actors 
 
2.1) Was a neutral, “yes,” space created?  
2.2) Did participants from all sides contribute? 
2.3) Were ground rules established for equity among the participants?  
2.4) Did any of the engagements breakdown? 
2.4.a) If so, was there a reconciliation? 
 
3.1) Was a shared narrative created? 
3.1.a) If so, was the shared narrative created by all sides? 
3.2) Did the narrative transfer to Track I? 
3.2.a) Was the conflict resolved? 
3.2.b) Is the conflict still resolved? 
 
 
Section 2.7: Scope Conditions and Case Outline 
 
 Due to the overall necessity to narrow the scope of my inquiry, I have chosen to look at 
instances of ethnic, racial, or religious conflict within a sovereign state. These intrastate conflicts 
present richer cases of underlying psychological conflict then interstate conflicts which are often 
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based more on geographical power than the overall nature of the relationship of the actors 
involved. Further, the threshold that will determine if a case is plausible is if the conflict has 
been ongoing for more than a year. Conflict begins when the first casualty is reported. A 
casualty, in these instances, must not be combatants, rather they are citizens or persons affected 
by the conflict. The one-year mark will help to determine the sides of the conflict, as well as their 
overall strategies and desires from the conflict. A year of conflict will also create many 
conflicting narratives that will provide for substantive talks during the engagement. Moreover, 
the conflict must also meet the threshold of at least a hundred casualties within the first two years 
to be considered.  
 A total of three cases were selected for analysis. The first case is regarding the conflict in 
South Africa for the better part of the 20th century. This case provided the richest documented 
track two diplomatic engagements of any of the cases utilized. This allowed for further 
examination of additional elements in the case. However, it should be noted that each of the 
cases selected presented enough information to effectively trace the process and follow the 
structured model of analysis presented. The advantage of the South Africa case having richer 
detailed notes is simply that it allowed for further exploration into the reason South Africa found 
a resolution to its conflict.  
 The second case that is utilized is Northern Ireland and the conflict that waged for 
approximately thirty years in the late-1900s. This case provides an interesting perspective on the 
overall efficacy of track two engagements when only some improv theatre elements are present. 
Unlike in the first case of South Africa, Northern Ireland presents varying degrees by which 
improv theatre elements were present in the track two meetings.  
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 The final case that is used is Israel-Palestine. The main concern with this case is that it 
can be argued that it is not an intrastate conflict, but rather an interstate conflict. However, the 
conflict is based on an ethnic divide between the Israeli and Palestinian people and presents rich 
documented case of track two engagements that have been attempted throughout the years. These 
cases range from no improv theatre elements being used to all four of the elements being present. 
Therefore, the dynamics of the final case present a good amount of detail and information by 
which to assess the efficacy of improv theatre elements in track two diplomatic engagements.  
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Chapter 3: South Africa 
 In 1948, the all-white government of South Africa, led by the National Party, enacted 
legislation that promoted racial discrimination in public facilities and neighborhoods. 
Throughout the reign of apartheid, it became illegal for whites and people of other races to marry 
each other, as well as dictated the type of employment a person could get based on his or her 
race, and other forms of segregation and discrimination. Opposition to these laws quickly took 
root among the African National Congress (ANC), a South African political party that was 
founded in 1912 in response to the mistreatment of other races from the white political leaders of 
the time. Notably, in the late-1950s, the ANC worked to end apartheid with nonviolent measures 
of protest and civil unrest. However, on March 21st, 1960, after police opened fire in the black 
township of Sharpeville, killing more than 60 blacks, militant wings of the ANC were formed. 
Nelson Mandela, a founder of Umkhonto we Sizwe (“Spear of the Nation”), was imprisoned in 
1963 for promoting the group’s violent acts. Over the next two decades the conflict in South 
Africa became violent and separated the sides along racial and socio-economic lines. However, 
the political crisis and conflict in South Africa prompted many non-state actors within the 
country to try and resolve the conflict.  
 Due to the nature of the conflict in South Africa, a multi-lateral intrastate conflict, it is 
ripe for assessment of any track two diplomacy that occurred within the nation. The conflict in 
South Africa, like many others, was born from a series of state laws that caused divides in the 
nation’s population based on the differences of the citizenry. By enacting laws that forced 
segregation of the races the South African government was imposing a narrative upon its 
citizenry, rather than the citizens and communities driving the narrative in the nation. 
Throughout the conflict there were instances of citizens and groups attempting to shift the 
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narrative. The groups that attempted to shift the narrative were made up of business leaders, 
ANC leaders, journalists, and past government officials. Some of these attempts were through 
force, like the Umkhonto we Sizwe, and some of the attempts were through non-violent means. 
For the purposes of this analysis, the focus will be on the non-violent track two engagements that 
occurred in the 1980s and early 1990s. While the conflict started over two decades prior to any 
documented cases of track two diplomacy, there were instances of other non-violent acts of 
protests and dissent against the apartheid laws imposed by the government.  
While this paper does not directly ask the question to whether other acts of non-violent 
protest can shift narratives within nations of conflict, there are many examples in South Africa of 
citizenry engaging in actions and movements that helped to shift support towards resolution of 
the conflict. These non-violent acts will be discussed at the end of this chapter, as their 
importance in the overall resolution to the conflict is justified when focusing on the narrative 
appropriation aspect of the question to the effectiveness of a shared narrative of conflicting sides. 
Further, the non-violent acts that will be discussed will focus on performing arts organizations 
that worked to shift the narrative in the nation. This focus on the collaborative arts will further 
enumerate the possible power and effectiveness of utilizing improv theatre techniques in track 
two diplomacy engagements. Nevertheless, the first sections of this chapter focus on the track 
two diplomacy engagements that, woven together, form a shared narrative between the 
conflicting sides to helped bring about an overall resolution to the decades long conflict that 
caused a deep divide in South Africa.  
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Section 3.1: The Zambian Meeting 
 On September 13th, 1985, a meeting between four business executives and three 
journalists from South Africa and the ANC President, Oliver Tambo, and five ANC officials 
took place in Zambia’s capital of Lusaka. The engagement was facilitated by the Zambian 
President, Kenneth Kaunda. President Kaunda and the editor of the business magazine 
Leadership SA, Hugh Murray, organized the meeting largely due to President Kauda’s support of 
the ANC’s plight in South Africa. Further, due to the ANC’s exile in 1960, ANC headquarters 
was based in the Zambia capital of Lusaka.  
 The meeting took place after months of civil unrest in South Africa, which culminated in 
an ANC led bombing at Anglo-American headquarters in April of 1985. The unrest caused 
Anglo executives to become fearful of their workers who supported the ANC to disrupt their 
mining operations with strikes. Anglo held “roughly 50% of the Johannesburg Stock exchange” 
(Lieberfeld, p. 360, 2002), causing further worry that a disrupted market would exacerbate and 
cause more divides in South Africa because of the growing economic divide. 
For the Zambian meeting arranged by President Kaunda, the sides were made up of 
exiled ANC officials and business leaders from South Africa that had been divided by the 
conflict, due largely to the growing economic disenfranchisement. Gavin Relly, chairman of 
Anglo, led the South African delegation, which included South Africa Foundation (SAF) chief 
executive, Peter Sorour; former liberal member of the Progressive Federalist Party (PFP) and 
Parliament and current executive director of Anglo-America, Zac de Beer; and Anthony Bloom, 
an executive of Premier Milling. The ANC side was headed by ANC President Tambo. South 
African policy prevented the negotiation with terrorists, but because the engagement was in a 
different country, there was now law that prevented it from happening. Further, it was noted that 
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because the delegation from South Africa was led by business men, there would be little done by 
the government to prevent the talks (Lieberfeld, 2002). The disconnect between the business 
leaders in South Africa and the government of South Africa allowed for  flexibility in what could 
be discussed and how the structure of the talks and engagement could take place between the two 
sides. 
 In accordance with the scheme set up in the previous chapter, the format of this 
engagement is key. President Kaunda “chaired” the session, and he presented the sides with 
ground rules regarding the nature of the talks. One of the key components to these ground rules 
was an intermixing of the participants around the room. The sides started on opposite ends of the 
conference room table, but through suggestion of Tambo, they mixed up, as to not “face each 
other like opponents” (Lieberfeld, p. 259, 2002). This initial interaction set an equity among the 
participants that prevailed for the entirety of the six-hour meeting, which included lunch. Further, 
equity was built in the relationship of the participants as they chose to use only first names to 
address each other and not focus on titles or entities that participants might represent.  
True to form, the participants of this track two engagement were creating a space that was 
neutral and free of judgement. The overall shared expectation that there were no grand 
expectations or goals of the meeting provided a backdrop of ease and necessary collaboration for 
the engagement to create a shared narrative. Noting their common traits were important to the 
overall meeting, as all the participants found themselves bound together through their Christian 
backgrounds. This commonality acted as a bridge between the two groups. While President 
Kaunda brought the two groups together to discuss and engage in a freewheeling talk, the sides 
were that of two “opposing” sides. However, the opposition was not constructed by the 
participants, but rather by the system where they exist.  
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Table 3.1: South Africa 
 Zambian Meeting Dakar Conference ANC-Afrikaner 
England Meeting 
Series 
1.1) Year of 
Engagement 
1985 1987 1987 
1.2) Length of 
Engagement 
Six hours Three days Two days 
1.3) Number of 
Actors 
13 (7 from SA and 
6 ANC members) 
78 (61 Afrikaans 
and 17 ANC 
members) 
7 (4 Afrikaans and 3 
ANC) 
    
2.1) Was a neutral, 
“yes,” space 
created?  
Yes Yes – moving to a 
bar 
Yes 
2.2) Did participants 
from all sides 
contribute and build 
from each other? 
Yes Yes Yes 
2.3) Were ground 
rules established for 
equity among the 
participants?  
Yes Yes  Yes 
2.4) Did any of the 
engagements 
breakdown? 
No Yes Yes 
2.4.a) If so, was 
there a 
reconciliation? 
n/a Yes Yes 
    
3.1) Was a shared 
narrative created? 
Yes Yes Yes 
3.1.a) If so, was 
the shared narrative 
created by all sides? 
Yes Yes Yes 
3.2) Did the 
narrative transfer to 
Track I? 
No No Yes 
3.2.a) Was the 
conflict resolved? 
No No Yes 
3.2.b) Is the 
conflict still 
resolved? 
n/a n/a Yes 
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 Along the scheme of the possible improv elements that were present in the six-hour 
engagement, there were three of the four elements. As noted in Table 3.1, there are elements of 
creating a neutral “yes” space for the participants to have a conversation and engagement free of 
judgment. This is evident by the location where the engagement took place, outside of South 
Africa, and by the manner in which the meeting was conducted. By mixing the participants 
around the table there is a recognition that everyone is there for some sort of common goal, even 
if that goal is not clearly stated or known in the beginning. Much like an improv show, the actors 
prepare and rehearse, but the performance begins when the shared narrative is created (Halpen et 
al., 1994). The Zambian meeting participants created an engagement free of judgement which 
allowed for them not only to connect with one another, but also create with one another.  
Further, the second element of building off other participants is when the narrative begins 
to form. The first element is providing structure for the creation of a shared narrative, and the 
second element is when the participants begin to create and discover what is possible through 
collaboration and understanding. In the Zambian meeting, there are examples of these building 
blocks coming to fruition specifically when the discussion was focused on South Africa’s 
economic growth. The businessmen explained that they believed for economic growth in South 
Africa, the nation must adopt a more capitalistic view as opposed to nationalized business. In 
using the economic growth of South Africa, the groups could begin to speak about the other 
issues that were linked with the economy, namely laws and legislation around segregation that 
prevented individual rights to prevail over group rights (Bloom, 1985). By the suggestion of the 
business leaders to focus on the economic growth of South Africa, the participants could speak 
about other issues that may not have been as approachable if not rooted in the foundation of 
economic growth.  
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The third element present in the Zambian meeting is the equity of all participants. Like 
the first element is its efficacy of the participants, the third element provides a structure within a 
shared narrative can be created (Crossan, 1998). The participants in the Zambian meeting 
allowed for this to be present in a myriad of ways, specifically in having the participants inter-
mixed and not having any one member of the engagement lead. Rather the engagement being 
chaired by delegates of both sides provide that the members could speak more freely and open, 
thus providing a more well-rounded perspective on the conflict in South Africa. A more 
informed perspective and a structure that provides freedom to posit claims allows for the 
engagement to create more from the reality of the conflict.  
The final element, which was not present in the Zambian meeting was the success from 
failure element. This element would have required that the engagement have something go 
wrong or something cause a breakdown in the talks. However, whether due to the structure of the 
meeting or the six hour duration of the meeting, this element was not present in the Zambian 
meeting. 
 This engagement acted more of a primer for further engagements than a catalyst of 
change in South Africa. The narrative created was more general than specific in nature. 
However, the meeting in Zambia brought a furthering of the narrative that statutory racial 
discrimination in South Africa should end (Lieberfeld, 2002). This overall narrative is one that 
many citizens already held, but what was different was the way in which the parties engaged 
with one another. The business leaders adopted further understanding and appreciation for the 
plight of the ANC members. Conflict, specifically violence within conflict areas, can be very 
deliberate in nature. This was much of the case with the acts of violence that the ANC engaged 
in in the mid-20th century. However, an understanding of the perception of how the violence 
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looks from outside members and other citizens provided ANC exiles in the Zambian meeting to 
see the need for other solutions.  
 The existence of three of the four elements from improv theatre in the Zambian meeting 
and the creation of a shared narrative suggest that there is possibility that the elements of improv 
theatre made the engagement in track two diplomacy more effective. If, for example, President 
Tambo had not suggested that members inter-mix within groups around the table, would 
participants have been as enthusiastic to actively participate in the discussion? Further, if the 
talks were not grounded and built upon the economic growth needed in South Africa, would the 
narrative have even mentioned the woes of black workers? The building blocks, neutral space, 
and overall equity in the process of the Zambian meeting provided a more open and free dialogue 
that produced a clear shared narrative that the racial discrimination statutes in South Africa are 
harmful to South Africa.  
 
Section 3.2: The Dakar Conference 
 From July 9th to 12th, 1987, a conference was held between seventeen ANC officials and 
sixty-one Afrikaans-speaking intellectuals from the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for 
South Africa (IDASA), in Dakar, Senegal.  The key connection between the initial meeting in 
Zambia and this conference was a meeting in 1985 between Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, the South 
African parliamentary opposition leader, and Anthony Bloom and Zac de Beer. Bloom and de 
Beer expressed their eye-opening experience of conversation and talks with the ANC official in 
Zambia. As Slabbert (1998) put it in a later interview “I just became very impressed with…how 
we had been indoctrinated,” a turn of phrase to express the embargo on attempted diverse 
thinking in South Africa that was banned at the time, as the government tried to control the 
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narrative. A few months after his meeting with Bloom and de Beer, Slabbert resigned from 
Parliament, and along with Alex Boraine founded the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for 
South Africa. IDASA was the organizing organization of the Dakar conference, and sought to 
bring together a multi-racial group of intellectuals to discuss policy in South Africa (Lieberfeld, 
2002).  
 The conference was different from the Zambian meeting by sheer size and number of 
participants. In having so many participants, there is difficulty in assess the overall ability of all 
participants to contribute on each side. However, there are notes that as the conference broke out 
into further sessions the participants became more comfortable and were more ready to speak 
about the issues plaguing South Africa. The conference itself was held in a hotel in Dakar, which 
provided a sense of “neutrality,” but what was more influential was the hotel bar. Due to the long 
nature of the conference, many participants found themselves resigning to the hotel bar. This is 
where the most substantive talks happened among the participants. As Peter Gastrow (1998) 
explained, “…you couldn’t put up a front all the time, and we were together for 18 hours a day, 
for several days.”  
The participants also shared a “sense of danger,” as many IDASA participants were 
hearing that many of their families were being harassed by South African security forces back at 
home. There were reports being given to many of the IDASA participants that their families were 
being harassed back in South Africa because of their participation in the talks with the ANC 
officials (Lieberfeld, p. 262, 2002). There was a commonality in the danger that all participants 
felt, some for the first time, in engaging with the other side. Although an active track two 
engagement, the engagement was beginning to affect official channels, which was made clear by 
the harassment. Many of the IDASA members were not used to the type of bullying by the South 
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Africa government, and this provided a shared experience for the participants to engage in with 
the ANC members.  
 The Dakar conference’s scale allowed for a rich sharing of experience between the 
participants. Further, it allowed for more time for the engagement to have some interplay with 
possible breaking down and reconciliation. This is partly the case with why both ANC officials 
and IDASA members reconvened at the hotel bar after long discussions. This moment provided a 
more open and neutral space and opportunity for the participants to speak about the conflict in a 
non-official and intellectual way. While not well documented, the conversations at the hotel bar 
were likely to provide a much different perspective on the public front that the conference 
provided through its own means. Also, the hotel bar provided an unofficial refuge for when 
participants were feeling overwhelmed by the sheer volume of information and perspectives that 
were being provided by the conference.  
 The Dakar conference is a ripe with examples of improv elements and the structure of the 
conference allows for that structure to permeate into the narrative that the participants created. 
First, the aspect of the space that the conference was held is that of a neutral state outside of 
South Africa. Further, the conferences multiple venues within the hotel allowed for more open 
discussion of perspectives and narratives between the participants. Moreover, the willingness of 
the IDASA members to even attend the conference marked a shift from the central policy in 
South Africa. Their attendance at the conference encouraged the overall neutrality and non-state 
sanctioned nature of the conference. This element being present, just as in the Zambian meeting, 
provided a structure by which the participants could be open with one another about their 
perspective on the conflict in South Africa.  
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 Second, as Table 3.1 suggests, the participants could build off one another to create a 
shared narrative. Perhaps most important was how the participants decided to build off the need 
for the support of whites in South Africa for change to occur at the state level. This change is 
only possible when each of the sides are willing to percieve it as such. The overall effectiveness 
of this element, in this case, is built around the premise that the participants all very acts against 
the South African government, by attending the conference, are in themselves acts to create a 
stronger shared narrative among the participants. 
 Third, the conference was set into a structure that required equity among the participants. 
The conference, while chaired, largely consisted of breakout sessions of the various participants. 
The sessions provided an intimate environment for the participants to share their narratives and 
perspectives. These sessions would then come together as a whole to create the group’s overall 
narrative that posited the importance of the willingness of the South African government to 
negotiate. Further, the smaller sessions allowed for the participants to share their own stories and 
grievances with other members that may have found commonality in the story. The structural 
importance of the third element of improv, as well as the first, is that without that structure there 
is very little chance for the interactions that occur between participants to be real and based in 
truth. The truth of the participant’s perspectives is key to creating the narrative that the 
participants share by the end of the engagement (Halpen et al., 1994).  
 The final element that is key to improv theatre is applicable in the Dakar conference case. 
While no talks or sessions ended in a breakdown of communication, there was an understanding 
that the long hours of the conference had worn out many of the participants. In effect, the 
participants were having their own breakdowns that provided for some reconciliation to take 
place. These reconciliations happened primarily at the hotel bar, where many of the ANC 
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officials pointedly addressed the IDASA participants in a less official manner than in the 
conference. Perhaps the most important place during the Dakar conference , the hotel bar was an 
unofficial meeting place for participants to air grievances that they may not have spoken about in 
any other location or fashion. 
 Perhaps it is the nature of the first and third structural elements that creates a sense of 
importance to the structure of the talks when employing theatre elements. However, the final 
element suggests that perhaps it is sometimes important for these structures to break down to 
create a better, more true narrative. This is the case with the Dakar conference; all the elements 
were present, and it is because of the structure of the talks that the narrative the participants 
created is so powerful and meaningful. There was not a structural breakdown; rather, a 
perspective breakdown occurred when the participants were engaging in unofficial talks at the 
hotel bar. These engagements provided the participants with more perspective to garner a larger 
amount of growth in their shared narrative.  
 However, it could be argued that the Dakar Conference was more of a media stunt than a 
substantive conversation of ideas. Nevertheless, the participants found a shared narrative in the 
restrictions and lack of willingness to negotiate coming from the South African government. 
After the conference the participants made a joint declaration that the government needs to open 
negotiations with ANC officials, and the government has been the primary obstacle to progress 
in South Africa (Lieberfeld, 2002). This joint declaration further exemplifies that possible 
effectiveness in employing improv theatre elements in track two diplomacy engagements can 
exist once does. The declaration was one made from a shared narrative that was created from by 
the participant’s willingness to open their perspectives up to the other side and create with them 
something that could change South Africa for the better. 
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Section 3.3: The ANC-Afrikaner England Series   
 From November 1987 to February 1990 a series of six meetings were held between elite 
Afrikaners with ties to the National Party South African government and senior ANC officials.  
Much like the Zambian meeting, the person responsible for the meetings taking place had 
important ties to coal mining in South Africa. Humphrey Woods, the Vice-Chairman of 
Consolidated Goldfields (Cosgold) had attempted since the early 1980s to set up a meeting with 
ANC officials and persons in South Africa that had close ties with the government. Consolidated 
Goldfields is a coal mining company based in Britain, with key holdings in South Africa.  
A consultant of Consgold, Fleur de Villier, connected with Willie Esterhuyse, a political 
philosophy professor at Stellenbosch University, to begin setting up the meeting (Lieberfeld, pg. 
264, 2002). The president of South Africa, P. W. Botha had Esterhuyse as a political advisor and 
Botha’s daughter studied under Esterhuyse at university (Esterhuyse, 1998). Esterhuyse recruited 
two other professors, Sampie Terreblanche and Willie Breytenback, both of whom served in 
government for the talks.  
The ANC side was led by ANC President Tambo’s committee head, Thabo Mbeki. The 
ANC also include members that had attended the Dakar conference, Aziz Pahad, Tony Trew, and 
Harold Wolpe (Lieberfeld, p. 264, 2002). The initial meeting was held November 1st and 2nd, 
1987 in Henley, England. The initial meeting was chaired by Michael Young, the head of 
Consgold communications and corporate affairs. Much like the Zambian meeting the sides 
agreed that the talks were not about negotiating, but about finding out information and the 
perspectives of both sides.  
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The talks encouraged the members to think critically about what possible interests they 
had and concessions they would make for a reconciliation of the South African government to 
take place. The Afrikaners emphasize the importance that timing played in their meeting; 
because of the violence that ANC engaged in the South Africa government was unlikely to act 
before 1987 from fear that it would come across as “violence paying off” (ANC, p. 7, 1987). The 
groups engaged in intellectual conversations about what was possible through their 
communications. Esterhuyse enumerated that he would be able to communicate their discussion 
to top security officials in the South African government. This allowed an openness to what the 
ANC officials were willing to speak about and how they expressed their views on the current 
policies of the government.  
Through the engagement there was an understanding and willingness by the ANC 
officials that an armed conflict was far from what was desired. This allowed an openness in how 
the Afrikaners could proceed in disseminating the information to the government officials, as it 
promoted the idea of negotiations between sides rather than hinder the possibility of negotiations. 
After the initial meeting, Esterhuyse led five more Afrikaner groups to England for meetings 
through the next three years, each time with a desire to promote that narrative created in the first 
of opening negotiations through official’s channels in hopes of preventing armed conflict in 
South Africa.  
The series of meetings in England provided a final tipping point in the overall resolution 
of conflict in South Africa. The elements of improv theatre are found throughout the meetings. 
Initially the understanding of the space as a place for perspectives and views to be expressed, but 
no formal negotiations were happening showed both sides that there was a sense of neutrality 
around the meeting. There were few expectations for each side to point to throughout the 
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meeting so when the engagement was happening there was an open flow of communication from 
side to side. The space itself was neutral, being in England and not South Africa. This allowed 
the ANC officials that were present at the Dakar conference to further the narrative created to 
this engagement.  
Moreover, the ability of the participants to build off each other was central to the success 
of the engagement. The ANC members that were present at the Dakar conference brought a 
narrative that was created by other intellectual Afrikaners, which could further build up the 
narrative created by the meetings in England. This improv element is further demonstrated 
through the growing narrative of wanting negotiations and a move away from violent 
demonstrations by the participants. There is a wholeness in the willingness of the participants to 
accept and disseminate this information to the South African government officials that is key to 
the overall success of the shared narrative.  
By nature of the engagement, there is equity built within the status on the individuals that 
are engaging in the conflict. Even though the Afrikaners hold a more direct line to the official 
channels of negotiation, the engagement itself in England is based on equity of the participants’ 
perspectives and own narratives. The narrative that is created by the participants is one that 
provided a more diverse and unique perspective on how the conflict in South Africa had and will 
play out in the future. Further, the structural nature of the third element requires that the question 
of equity be directed to the participants of that engagement, to which the engagement follows. 
There may be questions as to whether the influence of a participant in the official channels (i.e. 
Esterhuyse) affects the overall equity of the participants. The engagement as moment in time is 
the focus of these questions, and during the meeting all the participants were engaged in an 
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equitable sharing of perspectives and views that provided a space for the creation of a shared 
narrative among all the participants (Halpen et al., 1994).  
By the nature of the series of meetings there is a breakdown in the engagements. Due to 
the span of the meetings over two and a half years, each time a meeting ended there was a 
breakdown, as time was allotted to create a shift in the narrative that was created. However, 
because the meetings continued to happen with key players that were the same, the narrative 
could grow and become more relatable and sharable as more participants engaged in the 
meetings. The series of meetings provided a unique opportunity to include more people in a 
narrative with shifting events over a period of time.  
Similar to the Dakar conference, by possessing all four elements of improv theatre the 
engagements created a more concrete shared narrative. In the case of the England meetings, the 
conflict was resolved during the series of meetings. This furthers the notion that improv theatre 
elements can promote successful track two diplomacy engagements. Specifically, when there is a 
tie in between the various track two engagements, such is the case with the Dakar attendees who 
participated in the England meeting, then the narrative that is created can further the purpose of 
resolving the conflict in the country. The structural nature of the first and third elements provides 
a throughout base to determine possible effectiveness of track two engagements. The second and 
fourth elements are more reactionary in nature and allow for the spontaneity and openness that 
improv theatre can provide to track two diplomacy engagements.  
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Section 3.4: Help in creating a narrative 
 Track two diplomacy, whether utilizing improv theatre elements or not, is based in 
conflict resolution and the attempt to create a narrative of change within a conflict. Throughout 
South African apartheid there are instance of acts of art shifting public opinion and creating a 
concurrent narrative with those created by the track two diplomacy engagements. One of the best 
examples of this is the Market Theatre of Johannesburg. On Jun 21st, 1976, the theatre opened as 
a “non-racial” theatre (Graver & Kruger, 1989). The premise of the theatre was simple: 
everyone, regardless of race, deserves to experience theatre. The audiences that came to see 
shows at the Market Theatre were not segregated as the law mandated, and therefore were 
breaking the law. Further, the cast and company producing shows at the Market Theatre was 
integrated and produced plays written by people of every race.  
 The rationale by the South African government to not shut down the Market Theatre was 
that they were a “legitimate” form of entertainment for white citizens (Opperman, 1993). 
Although the Market Theatre produced plays by blacks, because much of the audience was white 
there was an air of legitimacy around them. The plays that were produced by the Market Theatre, 
for example Black Dog and Born in the RSA, gardening international attention, but also provided 
a safe environment for protest in South Africa. The narrative that was created through the Market 
Theatre was that segregation prevents the furthering of art and life.  
 Art acted as a catalyst for action in South Africa. The shift in the narrative from violence 
to peaceful reconciliation was prompted by many different individuals coming together to 
provide a rational examination of the conflict in South Africa. In terms of the structural nature of 
the talks, the engagements followed closely with the elements of improv theatre. All the track 
two engagements in the South Africa conflict possessed the first three of the elements, which 
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points to the importance of structure within the engagements. Two of the three engagements 
possessed the final element, which provided a furthering of the shared narrative that was created 
through the second element of building blocks. The overall effectiveness of the cases relies on 
the power of the shared narrative created and the narrative created throughout the engagements 
drove the conflict to a resolution. While the official track was not examined here, the clear 
importance of track two on the shifting narrative of the conflict is important to note. 
 Conflict in South Africa was predicated on legislation and laws that caused narratives of 
each side to lose trust in the other sides. To resolve the conflict the sides needed to create a 
shared narrative based on their own perspectives and views. Track two diplomacy allowed this 
interplay and collaboration to take place between the sides, and the overall advantage was a 
shared narrative by both sides that drove an end to the conflict. The importance in terms of 
effective track two diplomacy is how the improv theatre elements affected that success.  
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Chapter 4: Northern Ireland 
 For thirty years in the late 20th century violent conflict roamed the streets of Northern 
Ireland. From October 5th, 1968 to April 10th, 1998, the period known as “The Troubles,” a 
conflict over Northern Ireland’s status as part of the United Kingdom brewed along religious and 
political ideological lines. Unionists, who were chiefly Protestant, favored staying part of the 
United Kingdom, whereas nationalists or republicans, who were chiefly Catholic and were in the 
minority, favored becoming a part of the Republic of Ireland. Preceding The Troubles, the 
parliament of Northern Ireland was made up almost entirely of unionist Protestants, who 
attempted to ease tension with Catholics by ending forms of institutional discrimination that 
were faced by Catholics. However, moves towards ending institutional practices angered the 
broader Protestants who made up a majority.  
 Approximately forty years before the start of The Troubles in Northern Ireland, the Irish 
War of Independence took place. The result of this conflict left Northern Ireland in a state of 
tension, existing as geographically attached to Ireland, but politically linked with Great Britain. 
The Anglo-Irish Treaty, which prompted the cease-fire between British and Irish military forces, 
freed twenty-six counties and left six counties under British rule. The division fell very similarly 
to the dividing lines of the violence experienced in the north-eastern part of Ireland, as opposed 
to the south and west portions. The violence in the northeast was between Catholics and 
Protestants, while in the south and west the conflict was largely between the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) and British forces. Following the Anglo-Irish Treaty on December 6th, 1921, 
Northern Ireland plunged deeper into civil war for eleven more months, which included 
Catholics, Protestants, IRA forces, and British Forces engaging in violence, and ended in late-
   
   45 
1922 with the death of Michael Collins, who was the leading strategist of the IRA attacks in 
Northern Ireland.  
The 1960s saw civil rights movements all over the world, and Northern Ireland was no 
different in the beginning. The civil rights movement in Northern Ireland had many goals which 
ranged from voting rights for all citizens to ending housing discrimination based on religion. 
During the beginning of the movement, in 1965, the government of Northern Ireland allowed 
protests and marches. However, on October 5th, 1968 the government banned a civil rights march 
in Derry. Catholic protesters defied the ban and marched on the streets. The government 
responded by sending in the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) police force. The RUC forces 
surrounded and beat the protesters, injuring over one hundred of them. This incident is largely 
believed to be the start of The Troubles as it was broadcast on television and shown around the 
world as the first major violent act between the sides in Northern Ireland. 
The conflict in Northern Ireland lasted for nearly three decades, and some have argued 
the reason was due to the nature of the conflict. As Neil Jarmen explains, “there was no broadly 
accepted understanding of the nature, cause, or outcomes of the Troubles” (pg., 2009). This 
assertion suggests that the conflict in Northern Ireland lasted so long because there was a lack of 
understanding among the sides as to what exactly the conflict was about. This lack of 
understanding provided the people of Northern Ireland a ripe opportunity to engage in track two 
diplomacy with each other to see if a joint narrative could be created. The possibility of creating 
a joint narrative is perhaps amplified by the lack of a prevailing narrative on either of the sides in 
the conflict.  
There were many negotiated treaties attempted. One of them, the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
of 1985, will be discussed during one of the track two diplomacy engagements. The agreement 
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was made between the United Kingdom and Ireland to give the Irish government an advisory 
role in the Northern Ireland government. The agreement also made it clear that any agreement to 
join the republic of Ireland must be agreed upon by a majority of Northern Ireland citizenry.  
Over the course of the Troubles more than 3,600 people were killed and many more were 
injured (Jarmen, 2009). The conflict in Northern Ireland, not dissimilar to the South Africa case, 
was largely caused by a majority party government that held power for decades preceding the 
conflict. This dimension adds an interesting insight into the overall efficacy of track two 
diplomacy to shift the narrative in the nation to align with the citizenry, rather than the 
government creating the narrative. Within this chapter there are two track two engagements that 
are discussed. The first took place in 1988 and was facilitated by a Lutheran pastor. The second 
track two engagement that will be discussed is possibly the most intriguing as it took place with 
a trip to South Africa in 1994. The presence of organizations that promote open dialogue 
between groups in Northern Ireland is also discussed.  
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Section 4.1: The Duisburg Meeting 
 October 14th and 15th 1988 brought together members of the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP), Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), and Alliance 
Party in Duisburg, West Germany. The parties fell along the following lines in the conflict: 
unionist side included the DUP, UUP, and the Alliance Party.; and the republican side included 
Sinn Fein and SDLP. The engagement was organized and facilitated by Dr. Eberhard Speicher, a 
German Lutheran clergyman who sought to help bridge the conflict in Northern Ireland. The 
meeting participants, while not all disclosed, are reported to have included churchmen, 
politicians, and paramilitaries. The overall meeting in Duisburg was dubbed a failure, largely due 
the leaks of the politicians that were present (Arthur, 1990). The politicians included Peter 
Robinson (DUP), Austin Currie (SLDP), Jack Allen (UUP), and Gordon Mawhinney (Alliance 
Party). The diversity of participants should have allowed for more ripe discussion over the 
issues. However, the Duisburg Meeting did not set up the overall scheme of the meeting with the 
notions of open communication. 
 The overall facilitation of the meeting in Duisburg was done by Dr. Speicher, who 
proposed a four-point agenda to the participants. The agenda proposed was created by Speicher, 
which would seem to promote a sense of neutrality in the engagement. Nevertheless, even 
though Speicher was not from Northern Ireland and directly involved in the conflict, his being a 
Lutheran clergyman provided enough reason for some of the participants to see him as biased 
and pulling his leverage on one side of the conflict, the Protestant side (Arthur, 1990). This was 
not necessarily the case for Speicher, who believed he proposed a fair and neutral agenda for the 
talks. The agenda attempted to punt the implementation date of the intergovernmental conference 
created by the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 to a later date, and in the meantime the parties 
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would hold discussions. Not only was the agenda seen as non-neutral, but also the overall 
secrecy of the meeting was nullified by leaks regarding of the participant’s names. The names of 
the politicians from their respective parties led to questions of the decision-making authority 
given by party officials to these politicians (Arthur, 1990).  
 Key to this engagement is its classification as a track two diplomatic engagement rather 
than an official track negotiation. The politicians that agreed to participate in this engagement 
did so under the pretense that it was merely an exercise in relationship-building and not a 
negotiation of terms (Arthur, 1990). This ability of the participants to actively participate as 
equals was predicated around the notion that each member could trust that the engagement would 
remain a secret. However, when the names of the participants were released any trust that might 
had been built up throughout the meeting was lost immediately. The politicians were forced to 
distance themselves from the engagement, because the engagement was not a negotiation. Track 
two diplomacy relies on the ability of the participants to trust that the engagement will not 
necessarily lead to an outcome, rather it may simply lead to trust. 
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Table 4.1: Northern Ireland 
 The Duisburg 
Meeting 
South Africa Trip 
1.1) Year of 
Engagement 
1988 1994 
1.2) Length of 
Engagement 
Two days Seven days 
1.3) Number of 
Actors 
Five to Eight Seven (Northern 
Ireland) 
   
2.1) Was a neutral, 
“yes,” space 
created?  
Partial Yes 
2.2) Did 
participants from 
all sides contribute 
and build from each 
other? 
No Yes 
2.3) Were ground 
rules established 
for equity among 
the participants?  
Partial Yes 
2.4) Did any of the 
engagements 
breakdown? 
Yes No 
2.4.a) If so, was 
there a 
reconciliation? 
No n/a 
   
3.1) Was a shared 
narrative created? 
No Yes 
3.1.a) If so, was 
the shared narrative 
created by all 
sides? 
n/a Yes 
3.2) Did the 
narrative transfer to 
Track I? 
No Yes 
3.2.a) Was the 
conflict resolved? 
n/a No 
3.2.b) Is the 
conflict still 
resolved? 
n/a n/a 
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The Duisburg meeting had interesting possibility of its overall applicability to improv 
theatre elements. Nonetheless, at each step of the engagement the elements of improv were not 
fully included. In terms of the first element, which is the creation of a “yes” space, there was a 
partial neutral space created (see Table 4.1). The overall location was neutral in the sense that the 
city of Duisburg was out of the conflict zone of Northern Ireland, and the usage of a Lutheran 
church as a meeting place provided a possible bridge between the Protestant and Catholic divide.  
By Dr. Speicher coming to the meeting with an agenda, as the facilitator, the overall neutrality 
for a created joint narrative was not possible. For purposes of assessing the effectiveness of track 
two diplomacy facilitation, Speicher’s actions could be assessed, but for purposes of evaluation 
in terms of improv theatre elements in relation to track two diplomacy his facilitation did not 
provide a full neutral space for which the participants felt they can participate freely without 
judgement.  
 Further, due to the leak and release of the meeting to media sources the participants were 
not able to actively engage equally with all sides in the conflict. The secrecy of the meeting was 
key to participant’s willingness to freely engage in meaningful conversations that would have 
allowed them to build off each other in hopes of creating a joint narrative. This, of course, was 
lost with the secrecy of the meeting. Compounding with the lost secrecy was the agenda set forth 
by Speicher which prevented open and meaningful discussion in terms of participants’ narratives 
coming forward to complement each other. The need for participants to build off each other is 
key to a successful improv theatre venture, this is also what would have allowed those who 
engaged in the Duisburg meeting to have created a shared narrative.  
 In terms of overall rules being established to promote equity among the participants, they 
were partially created. Like the creation of the neutral space in which the participants engaged in 
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their dialogue, the rules that were set up were not rigid but were malleable to the shift of the 
meeting from secret to public. Thus, the overall structure of the engagement was shifted away 
from the agenda, which acted as a set of rules, when the meeting became public and prevented 
any real equity among the participants. This was further exemplified by the assessment of the 
participants present by outside influencers in terms of what each participant brought to the 
negotiating table regarding the “imprimaturs of their leaders” (Arthur, p. 417, 1990). Track two 
diplomacy, not being about formal negations, does not follow the premise of the narrative that 
the outside influencers were pushing. Therefore, the overall equity within the Duisburg meeting 
was misaligned and did not provide the participants with a guarantee of equity in each of their 
respective narratives.  
 The final element of improv, which requires a breakdown then reconciliation of the 
engagement, was involved in the Duisburg meeting, but not with the outcome that promoted a 
resolution or a joint narrative. The overarching theme of the Duisburg meeting was the fact that 
it was a secret engagement that became public because of a lack of trust between participants, 
and this led to the engagement breaking down. Following the tenants of improv theatre this 
would have been acceptable if the engagement was then rectified by the participants. Due to a 
lack of trust, equity, and overall neutrality in the Duisburg participants the lack of a 
reconciliation was not surprising.  
 The Duisburg meeting provided an interesting look into a track two engagement that 
possessed parts of improv theatre elements, but lacked overall capacity of the structure within the 
four improv elements. Further, the overall narrative of distrust that came out of the Duisburg 
meeting runs counter to the key that makes the elements of improv theatre so effective. Trust 
requires that the participants see each other as having an equal say in the narrative being created. 
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This is the power of utilizing improv theatre elements, as each element helps to build the level of 
trust each participant has with the others. The building blocks allow each participant to feel more 
connected and ready to share a piece of their respective narratives with other participants.  
 
Section 4.2: South Africa Trip 
 In 1994, the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA) invited 
political leaders from Northern Ireland to South Africa to learn from the South African peace 
process. The delegation from Northern Ireland included: Peter Robinson (DUP Deputy Leader), 
Ian Paisley (DUP Member), Jim Wilson (UUP General Secretary), Jeffery Donaldson (UUP 
Honorary Secretary), Mark Durkan (SDLP Chairman), Johnathan Stevenson (SDLP Member), 
and Dr. John Alderdice (Alliance Party Leader). The DUP, UUP, and Alliance party were all on 
the unionist side and the SDLP was on the republican side. The trip was set to be a week from 
November 27th, 1994 to December 3rd, 1994 and was an attempt by IDASA to “provide them 
with the opportunity to study the South African experience and negotiation process since the 
1980s” (Grogan, p. 5, 1994).  
 The visit to South Africa was rich with meetings with members of the South African 
media, academia, NGOs, with individuals who contributed to the South African political 
transition, and most importantly with members of the other Northern Ireland parties. The aim of 
IDASA’s involvement with the Northern Ireland delegation was not to prescribe solutions, but to 
show a structure that worked in South Africa in hopes that members of the four parties from 
Northern Ireland would find parallel with their conflict. Further, the meetings included 
interactions with: Minister for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development, Roelf Meyer 
(National Party), ANC deputy Valli Moosa, the Minister for Water Affairs and Forestry, Kader 
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Asmal, Colin Eglin (Democratic Party), Suzanne Vos (Inkatha Freedom Party) and Ferdi 
Hartzenburg (Conservative Party). These meetings show a diversity of ideas and narratives from 
South Africa, which provided the delegation from Northern Ireland a ripe experience from which 
to learn. 
 The experience that the seven Northern Ireland political leaders had in South Africa 
provides an important look at the applicability of improv theatre elements in track two 
diplomacy. The week-long visit was not set as a negotiation, and as such it did not produce an 
agreement. Rather, it produced trust among the participants to move forward in the formal 
negotiations. Alderdice wrote following the trip that his party, the Alliance Party, would publish 
policy changes on police accountability in Northern Ireland (Brocklehurst, Scott, Hamber, & 
Robinson, 2000). The trip to South Africa would not seem to be a track two engagement from 
the outside perspective, but it is because the engagement possessed the first and third elements of 
improv theatre. The space where the engagement happened was a neutral space that did not 
provide a biased view of the conflict in an attempt to sway the narrative towards one party’s 
desires. Further, the facilitation by IDASA was done in a way that provided the members with 
neutral standing with members of opposing parties.  In having members of the opposing parties 
in South Africa speak with the Northern Ireland delegation a diversity of views was given to 
provide a rich full narrative of the process. 
 Regarding the participants contributing and building from one another, the reports after 
the trip show that members of the four parties were engaging in meaningful conversation that 
was not prompted by an agenda, but rather by each other. IDASA spokesman, Ivor Jenkins 
explains that it was the hope that the trip “would assist them in their thinking” (O’Loughlin, p. 5, 
1994). This mindset from the facilitating organization helped to structure the visit in such a way 
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that members could build from one another and could promote different ideas to solving the 
conflict. IDASA as the facilitating organization also set a structure in place that promoted equity 
among the members involved. This equity was not just shared by the members of the Northern 
Ireland delegation but also by the various party members of South Africa, who all had their 
chance to provide context and information. The ability of the IDASA members to provide a 
space that was neutral and free of egos afforded that the members of the delegation could provide 
their honest and true ideas to the group. Further, the trip never saw a breakdown in the talks and 
there was no reconciliation as such, so the final element of improv theatre was not present. 
However, due to the strong structural nature of the trip presented by IDASA there was little 
chance of this element being present.  
 The overall complexity of the Northern Ireland conflict greatly parallels that of the South 
African conflict, which provides a striking premise for why bringing members of the conflicting 
sides of Northern Ireland to South Africa provided Northern Ireland with a boost towards a 
resolution. There is an overall message created by the seven Northern Ireland participants 
proposed that if the sides could come together in South Africa to meet and discuss than they 
should be able to do the same in Northern Ireland. They did not create a narrative, but they 
actively agreed to future engagements with one another. The question as to whether this 
engagement is truly a track two engagement due to the high influence or power of the 
participants is null in terms of structure of the trip. In terms of the rationale and overall desired 
outcomes of the trip, it follows the scheme of a track two engagement. Having no clear outcome 
in mind makes the creation of the shared narrative between the participants more meaningful 
concerning the introduction of improv theatre elements, as it provides further fodder to the 
premise that utilizing these elements will increase the success rate of these engagements.  
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 Another facet to this engagement, which was absent from the Duisburg meeting, was the 
acceptance of outside influencers and actors. Rather than attempt a secret trip with the seven 
participants, the trip was announced in the media, along with the participants. To that end, 
however, throughout the trip there was little to no coverage, which allowed the participants to act 
within the neutral space that was provided in South Africa by IDASA. In creating a space that 
was both neutral, but surrounded by the cloud of outside observers, the engagement was able to 
better disseminate any narrative that was created throughout, which it did in the days following 
the engagement.  
 The trip to South Africa came during a crucial time in the official negotiation that was 
taking place in Northern Ireland. The trip itself promoted a renewed sense of importance for 
peace in Northern Ireland, and it prompted consequent meetings and negotiations that followed 
the scheme of official diplomacy more in line with that of furthering the dialogue with the 
decision makers in the political parties.   
 
Section 4.3: Bridging the Divide with Information   
 Northern Ireland was ripe with organization and outlets with people attempting to express 
their opinions to others. One outlet was opened by a reporter, Frank Millar, of The Irish Times. 
Millar was not simply a reporter, he was a former UUP executive. He was attempting to find a 
breakthrough in the conflict that raged in Northern Ireland, and he did this by conducting a series 
of in-depth interviews with various party leaders which included: Jim Molyneaux (UUP Leader), 
Peter Robinson (DUP deputy leader), Dr. Robin Eames (Church of Ireland Primate), and Dr. 
Cahal Daly (Catholic Bishop of Downa and Connor) (Arthur, p. 416, 1990). These in-depth 
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interviews helped to clear up the conflict and defined the “parameters of the problem” (Arthur, p. 
416, 1990).  
 Millar’s interviews with these party leaders helped to provide much needed information 
to other leaders and party officials in analyzing possible resolutions tot the conflict. However, it 
should be noted that these interviews directly oppose tenants of improv theatre elements. The 
issue becomes an assumption of participants to presuming an understanding of the other side 
through other channels rather than by the source of the conflict. The information is useful in 
terms of attempting to reporting on the overall efficacy of the peace process, but the information 
does create conflict in determining the efficacy of improv theatre elements in the resolution of 
the conflict.  
 Nevertheless, Northern Ireland presented a richer understanding of possible actions in 
track two diplomatic engagements where not all four improv theatre elements are present. The 
Duisburg meeting did not have all four elements present, and it did not resolve the conflict. The 
overall expectations of the Duisburg meeting also presented an issue in the possible solutions 
that could be presented because there was an agenda set forth rather than a structure to follow. 
The trip to South Africa presented an interesting overlap of cases, as it provided a space by 
which the participants could opening express their feelings and sides in the presence of company 
that had done the same just a few years earlier. The overall rules of the trip also presented a 
forum by which the participants could freely express themselves and interact with each other in a 
meaningful manner.  
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Chapter 5: Israel-Palestine 
 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is perhaps the most well-known ongoing conflict from the 
20th century. The conflict is also one that has a well-documented case of the various conflict 
resolution attempts made by numerous different individuals, organizations, and countries. During 
World War II the Nazi Holocaust prompted a heavy migration of Jewish people from Europe to 
Palestine. This migration was after Britain seized control of Palestine in 1917 from the 
Ottomans, and produced the Balfour Declaration that launched a clear muddling of the 
understanding of what the intention and purpose behind Jewish migration to Palestine (PBS - 
Promises, 2001). A reoccurring issue with the attempted resolutions to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is the attempted brush over the history of the two sides. Much of the literature begins 
after the war of 1948 and does not properly align with the focus of the sides narratives in terms 
of what has been passed from previous generations. There is a ripeness in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict that produces an ability for each side to actively create their own narrative within their 
own spheres, but the narrative does not often reach the other side because there as so many 
intermediaries in the conflict focus is hard to obtain. 
 In 1947, the United Nations (UN) recommended the parting of Palestine into two separate 
states, one for Arabs and one for Jews. This recommendation was rejected by every neighboring 
Arab state in the region, as the narrative coming out of the United Nations was not clear in terms 
of the relocation of Jews and Arabs. In other words, there were no simply divisible lines because 
Jews and Arabs were living interchangeably in the nation. Following the UN’s recommendation, 
in 1948, Zionist leaders declared a state of Israel causing fights and conflict to break out (PBS - 
Promises, 2001). This declaration was also made as British forces began leaving the country. For 
the next two decades, mini-skirmishes were fought between Israel and many of its Arab 
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neighbors, including Egypt and Jordan. In May of 1964 the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) was formed. The following five decades to present time was filled with recurring conflict 
and attempted peace talks, including the well-known Oslo Accords in the 1990s (PBS - 
Promises, 2001). Nevertheless, with all the third-party intervention there has still been no 
concrete resolution made in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
 Throughout the conflict and attempted peace process there have been many diverse 
channels and modes of negotiation that were used. Some of these engagements fall into the 
definition of track two engagements, while others are more similar to official diplomacy 
attempts. A recurring theme throughout the process was regarding the overall usage of third 
parties. The third parties often were not there to facilitate an open dialogue, as much as they 
seemed to be present to further their own narrative. The most well-known peace agreement, the 
Oslo Accords, from the conflict are an example of the United States swooping in at the end of 
peaceful negotiations to further their own narrative as the peacekeepers of the world. There are 
examples of this taking place with the Arab nations around Israel and Palestine, but also 
regarding the United Nations actions.  
 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict provides a unique perspective on the creation of narratives 
by both sides and the possible effect that improv theatre elements can have on the creation of 
these narrative because the conflict contains so many facets. Further, the conflict provides an 
overall consider creation of the interplay between track two diplomacy and official diplomacy. 
There are many instances wherein multitrack diplomacy has taken place in attempt to resolve the 
conflict. However, the conflict is still not resolved. There are many possible explanations for 
this, but what is clear is that without an understanding of the other side’s narrative in possible 
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connection with their own, each side is shutting down any possible resolution before it can begin 
to work in the confines of the narrative.  
 Two specific engagements are going to be used to analyze the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The first is perhaps the first ever documented case of track two diplomacy in modern history and 
it was done by Herbert Kelman and Stephen Cohen in 1971. This engagement is a workshop that 
was meant truly to bring people from the both sides together for the simple purpose of gathering 
each side own perspective and narrative of the conflict, and perhaps in the discussion there was 
some interplay at possible solutions. The second engagement that is discussed was part of a 
multi-track approach to solving the conflict, which took place in December of 1988 and January 
of 1989. This engagement helped to form the basis of possible track jumping and transfer of the 
narrative to an official track.  
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Section 5.1: Pilot Workshop   
 Stephen P. Cohen and Herbert C. Kelman taught a seminar in 1971 on “social-
psychological approaches to international relations” (Cohen et al., p. 166, 1977). Both Cohen and 
Kelman were Jewish, and they noted this before proceeding with the workshop. Further, the 
workshop that was took was more for intellectual and scholarly assessment than practical 
application. Due to the workshop being used for scholarly application many of the participants 
are not named, and rather they were given distinctions within the parties they fell into. The initial 
plan was to have four Israelis, four Palestinians, and four Egyptians. However, they were 
unsuccessful in recruiting Egyptians for the workshop. There were also no women involved in 
the workshop either. Cohen and Kelman fell into the “third party” (p. 168, 1977) of the 
workshop and therefore they brought in an Arab scholar who was well versed in Arab affairs and 
conflict to even out the facilitators.  
 The structure of the workshop functioned to attempt as open an interactive dialogue on 
the issues between both sides. Before the workshop began each of the participants participated in 
pre-workshop session. The pre-workshop session was presented as a type of vetting for the 
participants. Cohen and Kelman admitted that they believed “…each party should be given an 
opportunity to present its position fully…in the absence of the other parties” (p. 173, 1977). The 
pre-workshop session afforded that each side had an equal opportunity to speak about their own 
narrative and be sure that it was clear among that side before speaking. In theory, this would 
have presented a nice forum for the participants to vent their frustrations or other issues. 
However, in terms of applicability with the tenant of improv theatre there is some dissonance. In 
presenting the participants with their own side to confirm the sides narrative there is a furthering 
of the narrative of each side own narrative rather than creating a joint narrative. Each side now 
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went into the workshop knowing the narrative that each on their sides believes in because they 
agreed to it. While, using improv theatre, would have all the participants jointly creating a 
narrative based on everyone’s narrative rather than their sides narrative.  
 After the pre-workshop session, each side was given the ground rules for the workshop.  
Some of the ground rules included that each participant take “an analytic stance” rather than one 
that was grounded in advocating (Cohen et al., p. 176, 1977). Another important rule created was 
that no participant was bound by the official position of their side, and they could subscribe to 
new ideas. They also agreed that the purpose of the workshop was mean to facilitate effective 
communication between the sides and a clearer understanding of each side. The third-party 
facilitators also agreed to remain as neutral as possible and not say if one side was right or 
wrong.  
 As the session was opened one of the Palestinian participants noted that he had concerns 
over the confidentiality of the participants. Where the facilitators believed, confidentiality was 
key to having a freeing and opening dialogue this participant saw it as the opposite and feared 
that a closed meeting would indicate that he “was engaged in secret dealing with the enemy” (p. 
177, 1997). The question of confidentiality loomed over the entire engagements, but ultimately 
the engagement’s participants remained confidential. 
 The workshop’s overall theme centered around nationalism and each side claim to the 
legitimacy of the other’s sides nationalism. Each side laid claim to it, and each side accepted, 
after prolonged discussion, the other sides claim to nationalism. The workshop culminated on 
day two to a breakdown of discussion. On day one there was an understanding made about 
Palestinian rights, and how each side took what the other said to mean something different from 
what was meant. Thus, on day two when one of the Palestinian participants requested the Israeli 
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participants to sign a document affirming what the Palestinian participant believed to be true a 
disagreement began. The overall workshop ended abruptly with a break for each side to caucus 
with one another. These caucuses allowed for each side to clear what was meant by what had 
been said a day prior. The participants ended up coming back together and talking through the 
disagreement. There was no solution to the existing problem, but the overall dispute was 
managed. The next day the participants formalized what was discussed in a document that they 
all signed. This document helped to form a cohesive joint narrative that was created by the 
participants.  
 In terms of what elements of improv theatre were present in Cohen and Kelman’s 
workshop there were at least two and a partial third element present (see Table 5.1). The 
existence and the effort put into the ground rules really did provide a space for all the 
participants to feel comfortable in participating. However, due to the nature of the facilitators, 
which Cohen and Kelman note, there was attempted neutrality and unbiased nature in the space 
that the workshop took place. Overall it was clear by the unwillingness of some of the 
participation that an overall “yes” space was not created. This was compounded by the fact that 
there was a pre-workshop session. There was a “yes” space created in this session, but the 
workshop session did not provide that space. Further, in terms of all the participants building off 
each other, because the workshop followed the pre-workshop, there was less likelihood that the 
participants in the session could effectively and openly build of the other participants. Finally, 
the element of breaking down was present and there was a reconciliation which proved to yield a 
positive outcome in terms of a joint narrative being created by the engagement.  
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Table 5.1: Israel-Palestine 
 Pilot Workshop Jerusalem, 
Hebron, and 
Ramallah Talks 
1.1) Year of 
Engagement 
1971 1988-1989 
1.2) Length of 
Engagement 
Three days Continuous 
1.3) Number of 
Actors 
8 (with 3 
facilitators) 
3 to 5 
   
2.1) Was a neutral, 
“yes,” space 
created?  
No Yes 
2.2) Did 
participants from 
all sides contribute 
and build from each 
other? 
Partial Yes 
2.3) Were ground 
rules established 
for equity among 
the participants?  
Yes No 
2.4) Did any of the 
engagements 
breakdown? 
Yes No 
2.4.a) If so, was 
there a 
reconciliation? 
Yes n/a 
   
3.1) Was a shared 
narrative created? 
Yes Partial 
3.1.a) If so, was 
the shared narrative 
created by all 
sides? 
Yes Yes 
3.2) Did the 
narrative transfer to 
Track I? 
No Yes 
3.2.a) Was the 
conflict resolved? 
n/a No 
3.2.b) Is the 
conflict still 
resolved? 
n/a n/a 
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 Cohen and Kelman’s workshop was the first one that they conducted. Kelman went on to 
do many more similar workshops throughout the subsequent four decades. This pilot workshop 
provided a good basis of a track two engagement in terms of true track two diplomacy. Cohen 
and Kelman state the lack of outcomes from this workshop because the participants were not 
close with any powerful or influence people. Therefore, while a joint narrative was created by 
the workshop, it could not transfer to track one.  
 
Section 5.2: Jerusalem, Hebron, and Ramallah Talks 
 The talks that took place from December of 1988 to January of 1989 were a testament to 
the flexibility of track two diplomacy in its overall ability to manage talks during multi track 
negotiations. Similar to many other track two engagements the meetings that took place were 
facilitated by an academic, Dr. Yair Hirschfeld. The talks that he engaged in from for the two-
month period ranged in their overall purpose and goal, but what was clear was that each meeting 
did have a goal for him to achieve. One of the first talks that happened in this series was with 
Immanuel Halperin who was a television journalist and nephew of Menachem Begin, the founder 
of Israel’s liberal Likud political party. This meeting also included Hana Siniora, a Palestinian 
journalist, and Mustafa Abdel Nabi Natche, the mayor of Hebron. The initial meeting between 
those four individuals led to a follow-up meeting with Hirschfeld and Faisal Husseini, the son of 
Abd el-Qada el-Husseini (Hirschfeld, pp. 64-65, 2014). 
 Key to these talks is that they were just that, talks. The engagement had no set agenda but 
rather were simple meet-ups between the participants. This flexibility allowed for a more 
freewheeling discussion, but also led to some instances where the talks lost course and direction 
for the overall narrative that was being created. The parts of the talks that were successful were 
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when the participants shared pieces of their own story that led Hirschfeld to a new piece of the 
narrative puzzle. At one point during the initial talks Halperin offered a very “soft tactical 
position,” (Hirschfeld, p. 64, 2014) which presented the Palestinian side to also over a similar 
soft position. What was different about the position in this context than in official and track one 
negotiations was the ability of the sides to accept that that other side could only go so far in their 
understanding of the conflict and possible solutions. There seemed to be an agreement on the 
overall context by which they were discussing the conflict, which led to a “very narrow” 
(Hirschfeld, p. 65, 2014) zone for an agreement, but there was a possibility.  
 The talks happened over a two-month span and consisted of only a couple meetings, but 
each time the purpose of the meetings was expressed through the facilitator, which was 
Hirschfeld. The overarching purpose of the meetings was for a resolution of the conflict, but the 
goal of these talks was to simply provide a channel by which certain negotiations could take 
place. Hirschfeld laid the groundwork for a larger mobilization of official negotiation to take 
place. This type of track two diplomacy does not lend itself to the use of improv theatre because 
improv is hard to produce focused purpose. In improv theatre, you can have the structure and 
outline, but you cannot start with the narrative, because it is created throughout. Thus, by pulling 
all of Hirschfeld’s talks together into a cohesive engagement of track two it is clearer to see the 
possible improv theatre elements that are present.  
 The first element of creating a “yes” space was apparent by the willingness of 
participants to give their opinions and stories to the group they were meeting with. Further, the 
neutrality would have been a question if the location of the meeting was constant, but because it 
moved from Jerusalem, Hebron, and Ramallah the overall possible bias was diminished by the 
comfortability of each participant in the different locations. The second element of participation 
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by all the participants was present in this case as everyone provided substantial building blocks 
for other participants to create. An example of this building off one another was when Siniora 
and Natche provided the name of another possible contact for Hirschfeld to contact. This 
willingness to provide a name, while not a narrative, was a crucial step to take that helped to 
further the dialogue that was being created. While the first two improv theatre elements were 
present in these meetings, the final two were not. Perhaps this lends to the nature of how the talks 
were more meetings than event, but the lack of any sort of ground rules could have hindered 
participants from feeling truly open and free to speak to the other participants. Overall this 
engagement offers an interesting look into the possible implications of having multi track 
negotiations that contain improv theatre elements.  
 
Section 5.3: Is the Divide Too Big? 
 Being one of the most well-known international conflicts does not provide much cover 
for track two dialogues to take place. Further, the conflict has reached a peak in the overall 
complexity of the narratives that have been created. Unfortunately, because of the complexity of 
the conflict, it is possible that the conflict is beyond what improv theatre elements can assist with 
in terms of track two endeavors. The sides that are involved are also very involved with other 
partners that possess certain ties to needed wand wants in the region which provided another 
challenge to the overall power structure in the region. Unlike the other two cases the overall 
length of the engagement proposed another barrier to the efficacy of the improv theatre elements 
to break down a decade’s years long conflict. 
 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict also possess another layer of third party involvement that 
the other cases did not possess. Due to the overwhelmingly high amount of involvement by other 
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actors such as the United States, the United Nations, Egypt, Jordan, Iran, etc., the ability to create 
a clear and consistent narrative become more difficult. Fort the two side that are involved there 
are not just their own interests and narrative, but narrative and interests that are being pushed by 
the other actors involved. This involvement leads too blurring of lines in terms of the true 
narrative that each side in the conflict sees as their own.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 The use of improv theatre elements in international diplomacy seems too strange to be 
effective in creating a resolution to conflict. Nevertheless, the elements of improv theatre have 
shown to be effective means of conflict resolution in businesses and organizations in 
contemporary business practices. The transfer to the international realm was likely to see similar 
success to the success that the companies and organizations have seen. In focusing on the four 
key elements of improv and specifically analyzing track two diplomatic ventures, a more effect 
means of analysis was created. By utilizing the structured, focused, comparison a(see Table 6.1) 
along with process tracing, the effectiveness of improv theatre on track two engagements was 
thoroughly measured. The three cases that were selected were broad in scope in terms of the 
years that the conflict spanned, yet each had the necessary elements present to fit in the analysis 
that was being done.  
The utilization of improv theatre elements on track two diplomacy engagements was 
presented throughout these three cases, each of which provided accounts of track two 
engagements in the respective conflict, and the cases ranged from a successful resolution to a 
still very present conflict. Each of the conflicts spanned some similar years, including most of 
the later-1980s and early-1990s. While the length of the conflict was different from case to case, 
each case was predicated by a law or statute that was put into place by the ruling government, or 
in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s case by the United Nations. Perhaps most important, each 
case provided enough detail and substance per track two engagement account to provide a 
detailed account of the engagement.  
By focusing heavily on the most successful case, in terms of the timeline of the conflict 
to a resolution, the South African case was easily traced from beginning to end from one track 
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two engagement to another. As seen in Table 6.1, the overall presence of improv theatre 
elements in the South African case also presents an important component in the success of 
resolving the conflict. In analyzing a somewhat successful case such as the Northern Ireland case 
the track two engagement that had more improv theatre elements, the South African Trip, came 
closer to helping resolve the conflict than the engagement where only partial improv theatre 
elements were present. The Northern Ireland case also presented an interesting perspective on 
how having outside perspectives, in this case the South Africans, to facilitate talks might be more 
effective than a group closer to the conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict presents its own set 
of circumstances for the overall longevity of a conflict and how it might affect the possibility of 
a resolution. However, in looking at the improv theatre elements that were present, there is a 
clear lack of presence that led to very little successful transfer to official diplomacy and aid in 
resolving the conflict.  
Each case provided something that the others did not. In terms of the South African case, 
the sheer size of Dakar Conference provided a rich account of facilitating a large-scale track two 
diplomatic mission. Further, the Dakar conference offered an interesting proposal in the terms of 
the location of the meeting, with some of the participants moving to the hotel bar to continue 
their conversation. The Northern Ireland case’s South African trip provided a richer 
understanding of what might happened when nations that have successfully resolved their 
conflict may be able to help other nations in conflict. In the Israeli-Palestinian case’s Jerusalem, 
Hebron, and Ramallah meetings an understanding of possibly how too much official 
involvement might sway a track two engagement off its intended effect. Each of the three cases 
provided a perspective that the other did not. Further, each case did have some improv theatre 
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elements involved in their track two engagements, yet the number of elements that were present 
varied greatly.  
The cases examined here each presented their own type of conflict. South Africa focused 
heavily on the economic impact of the conflict from both sides. Northern Ireland was more of a 
religious conflict and harder to manage from a conflict resolution perspective. The Israeli-
Palestinian conflict had been plagued by an official narrative that drove any attempt at resolution 
to little success. The analysis done on these three cases could suggest, what many have already 
concluded, that there are differences within certain conflicts that are unresolvable. The Israeli-
Palestinian case points to this, as the case presents itself beyond the scope of creating a shared 
narrative between the sides.  However, it could also be argued that these conflicts are all 
theoretically resolvable, while being different in nature. For example, the lack of improv theatre 
elements in the Israeli-Palestinian case is not the sole reason it remains unresolved, but given the 
experience of the other two cases it could be that successful application of improv theatre 
insights through the creation of a shared narrative could move even this conflict towards a 
resolution. 
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Section 6.1: The Key is Trust 
 When conflicting sides resolve to end a conflict the key to a successful resolution is trust. 
What is shown throughout the three cases that were analyzed was that the more improv theatre 
elements that were present in the track two engagement, the more trust was built among the 
participants. Due to the growing amount of trust in the participants of the South African case, in 
each of the three analyzed engagements, the overall success transfer to official diplomacy was 
effective. In looking at Table 6.1, the four improv theatre elements that were present in all the 
engagements produced an effective means of resolving the conflict. Conversely, in the Israel-
Palestine case and the Northern Ireland case, there was a lack of consistency between the usage 
of improv theatre elements in the engagements. This lack of improv theatre elements and lack of 
transfer to meaningful official diplomacy seems to be connected. The Northern Ireland Case’s 
Duisburg meeting perhaps exemplifies this best because of the inherent lack of trust due to the 
conflict of the facilitator as a partial participant in the engagement. This permeates strongly in 
the engagement, which does not allow for the trust to be built and grow into a meaningful 
outcome for the participants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   72 
Table 6.1 
 South Africa Northern Ireland Israel-Palestine 
1.1) Years of 
Engagement 
1985 -1994 1968-1998 1964-Present 
1.2) Length of 
Engagement 
9 years 30 years 53+ years 
1.3) Number of 
Actors 
Seven to Seventy-
eight 
Five to Eight Three to Eight 
    
2.1) Was a neutral, 
“yes,” space 
created?  
All  Partial  Partial 
2.2) Did participants 
from all sides 
contribute? 
All Partial Partial 
2.3) Were ground 
rules established for 
equity among the 
participants?  
All Partial Partial 
2.4) Did any of the 
engagements 
breakdown? 
Partial  Partial Partial 
2.4.a) If so, was 
there a 
reconciliation? 
All applicable None All applicable 
    
3.1) Was a shared 
narrative created? 
All Partial Partial 
3.1.a) If so, was 
the shared narrative 
created by all sides? 
All All All 
3.2) Did the 
narrative transfer to 
Track I? 
Partial Partial Partial 
3.2.a) Was the 
conflict resolved? 
All applicable Partial No 
3.2.b) Is the 
conflict still 
resolved? 
All applicable n/a n/a 
 
 There are instances in each of the engagements when trust was built, and in every 
instance, it was brought on due to the existence of one of the improv theatre elements. The 
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Northern Ireland case’s South African trip produced trust because of its ability to present a 
neutral space for participants from all sides to contribute, and the participants were all given 
ground rules by which they needed to follow. In the Israel-Palestinian case’s pilot workshop, a 
focus was put on trying to get the participants to trust each other. The pilot workshop did have 
many of the improv theatre elements present, each of which allowed the participants to begin to 
trust each other. This pilot workshop even ended with an agreement being written up and signed 
by the participants, which signified an important joint narrative that was created because of the 
trust that was facilitated through the workshop. The South African Case was rich with examples 
of trust building, but the most impressive was during the Dakar Conference when participants, 
free of the facilitator, decided on their own will to move their previous discussions to the hotel 
bar, where more trust was built. This instance is possibly one of the most important parts of the 
analysis because it was created due to the way that the conference was conducted. The Dakar 
conference, which had dozens of participants, still utilized all four elements of improv theatre. 
The commitment of the facilitators to present the conference in this way allowed for the track 
two diplomacy to flourish into a cornucopia of trust and joint narrative creation by the various 
participants.  
 The trust that needs to be built for a narrative to be created by both sides requires a tool to 
be used. By utilizing improv theatre elements there is a higher likelihood of success in the 
creation of a joint narrative that is shared by both sides. The improv theatre elements that are 
presented throughout provide a structure and guide in the successful creation of a joint narrative. 
However, the transfer of that narrative to official diplomacy is harder to analyze in terms of the 
overall resolution of the conflicts. In the cases that were used, the joint narrative that did transfer, 
for example in the South African case, did aid in the resolution of the conflict. This does suggest 
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that there is a possibility for a transference from track two to track one, in terms of the joint 
narrative created, but what is more important is that a narrative be created by both sides of the 
conflict. Thus, by utilizing improv theatre elements as a guide track two engagements are bound 
to be more successful in creating a joint narrative by the participants that was facilitated due to 
the trust of the participants.   
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